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PACE LAW REVIEW
Volume 7 Spring-Summer 1987 Number 3-4
Issue Honoring the Bicentennial
of the Constitution
Trois Sortes de Pouvoir. In Changing
Times
Josephine Y. Kingt
I1 y a dans chaque 6tat trois sortes de pouvoir; la puissance
l6gislative, la puissance ex6cutrice des choses qui dependent du
droit des gens, et la puissance ex~cutrice de celles qui dependent
du droit civil.
On appellera cette derniere la puissance de juger .. .
Precursive Theory
Thus did Montesquieu with confident pen declare that
three kinds of power existed in all forms of government: the leg-
islative, the executive, and the judicial. This was but one of
many conclusions and propositions expressed in The Spirit of
Laws, an ambitious analysis of forms of government (again three
- democracy, monarchy, and despotism) 2 and of laws (natural
law, divine law, ecclesiastical law, civil law, political law, and the
t Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law.
1. C. MONTESQUIEu, 2 DE L'EsPRIT DES Lois, livre XI, 86-87 (1834) (originally pub-
lished in 1748) [hereinafter L'EsParr DES Lois].
2. C. MONTESQUIEU, 1 THE SPIRIT OF LAWS, books II, III (T. Nugent trans. 1900)
[hereinafter SPIRIT OF LAWS].
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law of nations).3 In this far-ranging opus, the labor of twenty
years, Montesquieu slipped easily from general observations to
specific descriptive and critical examination of past and contem-
poraneous governments." It is in the section "Of the Constitu-
tion of England," that Montesquieu articulated his views on the
separate powers.
"Of the three powers . . . ," he commented, "the judiciary is
in some measure next to nothing . . . ." But concerning the ex-
ecutive and legislative functions, he recognized the existence of
checks and balances in the practical operation of British
government.
"The executive power.., ought to have a share in the legis-
lature by the power of rejecting .... And, "[w]ere the execu-
tive power not to have a right of restraining the encroachments
of the legislative body, the latter would become despotic .... "
Furthermore, since the legislature was composed of two parts,
"they check one another by the mutual privilege of rejecting."9
He did not perceive an equivalent necessity for legislative
constraint upon the executive.' 0 "But if the legislative power in
a free state has no right to stay the executive, it has a right and
ought to have the means of examining in what manner its laws
have been executed . . ... " In general, "[tihese three powers
should naturally form a state of repose or inaction. But as there
is a necessity for movement in the course of human affairs, they
are forced to move, but still in concert.""
Montesquieu's concept of a functional and structural tripar-
tite design of government easily spanned space and time to
alight on receptive soil in the American colonies. The Declara-
3. 2 SPIRIT OF LAWS, supra note 2, book XXVI.
4. Montesquieu wrote on such diverse topics as religion, political liberty, slavery,
commerce, climate, and torture.
5. 1 SPIRIT OF LAWS, supra note 2, at book XI, ch. 6.
6. Id. at 156. "Des trois puissances dont nous avons parle, celle de juger est en quel-
que facon nulle." 2 L'ESPRIT DES Lois, supra note 1, at 94.
7. 1 SPIRIT OF LAWS, supra note 2, at 159.
8. Id. at 157.
9. Id. at 160.
10. "For as the execution has its natural limits, it is useless to confine it .... Id. at
157.
11. Id. at 158.
12. Id. at 160.
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tion of Independence, Articles of Confederation, public ad-
dresses, and other contemporary sources reveal familiarity with
the philosophies of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau as well. A
great and rich reservoir of English and continental political the-
ory was available and within the knowledge of American
statesmen.
The Constitutional Convention
The Constitutional Convention, "une assembl6e des nota-
bles" according to Dr. Franklin,"3 was to commence its delibera-
tions on Monday, May 14, 1787, the "day appointed."' 4 Only two
states - Virginia and Pennsylvania - being represented on
that date, the meeting was adjourned from day to day, awaiting
the arrival of delegates. Not before Friday, May 25, was a quo-
rum in attendance, enabling George Washington to note in his
diary, "seven States being now represented the body was organ-
ized and I was called to the Chair by a unanimous vote."' 5
A few days later, Washington observed in a letter to
Thomas Jefferson,
[m]uch is expected from it [the Convention] by some; not much
by others; and nothing by a few. That something is necessary,
none will deny; for the situation of the general government, if it
can be called a government, is shaken to its foundation, and liable
to be overturned by every blast. In a word, it is at an end; and,
unless a remedy is soon applied, anarchy and confusion will inevi-
tably ensue."
And so began the work of one of the most momentous con-
stitutive assemblages of modern times, with Governor Randolph
of Virginia addressing the delegates. After reviewing the defects
of the Articles of Confederation, he introduced the famous Reso-
lutions outlining the framework of a new national government."
13. Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Thomas Jordan (May 18, 1787) in 3 M. FAR-
RAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 21 (1966).
14. George Washington: Diary (May 14, 1787) in 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 13, at
20.
15. George Washington: Diary (May 25, 1787) in 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 13, at
27.
16. Letter from George Washington to Thomas Jefferson (May 30, 1787) in 3 M.
FARRAND, supra note 13, at 31.
17. Madison's Notes (May 29, 1787) in 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 13, at 18-23.
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The necessary functions naturally fell into three major catego-
ries: a National Legislature of two branches, a National Execu-
tive (chosen by the Legislature), and a National Judiciary. s The
next day, in a committee of the whole house, the assembly
agreed to a first proposition: "Resolved that it is the opinion of
this Committee that a national government ought to be estab-
lished consisting of a supreme Legislative, Judiciary, and Execu-
tive." ' Notwithstanding animated debates concerning the mode
of selection of members of each branch, their authority, checks
against encroachments by other departments, and proposals for
a body with power to "negative" acts of the National and State
legislatures, the delegates through that long Philadelphia sum-
mer accepted a functional and structural distribution of political
power into three branches. Starting from the premise that the
government must be given the powers necessary to meet domes-
tic needs and foreign challenges, representatives from some of
the states, nonetheless, feared that centralization of authority
might produce a despotic, arbitrary executive. By providing for a
Supreme Court and a bicameral national legislature with exten-
sive enumerated powers, the new Constitution could reduce, if
not eliminate, the assertion of unchecked executive power.
The Federalist Papers, brilliant political essays, elaborated
the provisions of the new Constitution, urging its adoption and
assuaging the fears and reservations of some who questioned its
merit or efficacy. In examining the three branches of the na-
tional government established in articles I, II, and III, Madison
emphasized not only the separateness of the legislative, execu-
tive, and judicial powers, but also the necessary areas of con-
junction where functions were overlapping or complementary
and one department could "check" encroachment by another.20
18. Id. at 20-22.
19. Journal (May 30, 1787) in 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 13, at 30-31; Madison's
Notes (May 30, 1787) in 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 13, at 33, 35.
20. THE FEDERALIST Nos. 47, 48, 51 (J. Madison) (Bicentennial ed. 1976). In fact,
Madison seemed more concerned about legislative than executive usurpation of power.
The founders of our republics have so much merit for the wisdom which they
have displayed, that no task can be less pleasing than that of pointing out the
errors into which they have fallen .... They seem never to have recollected the
danger from legislative usurpations, which, by assembling all power in the same
'hands, must lead to the same tyranny as is threatened by executive usurpations.
THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 322.
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Hamilton, in his exposition of the judicial power, invoked
Montesquieu's uncompromising insistence on the independence
of that function: "'there is no liberty, if the power of judging be
not separated from the legislative and executive powers.' "21 He
added:
[I]n a government in which they [the three branches] are sepa-
rated from each other, the judiciary, from the nature of its func-
tions, will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of
the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or
injure them. The Executive not only dispenses the honors, but
holds the sword of the community. The legislature not only com-
mands the purse, but prescribes the rules by which the duties and
rights of every citizen are to be regulated. The judiciary, on the
contrary, has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no
direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society;
and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said
to have neither force or will, but merely judgment; and must ulti-
mately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the
efficacy of its judgments.
This simple view of the matter suggests several important
consequences. It proves incontestably, that the judiciary is be-
yond comparison the weakest of the three departments of power
22
The legislative department ... being at once more extensive, and less suscep-
tible of precise limits, it can, with the greater facility, mask, under complicated
and indirect measures, the encroachments which it makes on the coordinate de-
partments.... On the other side, the executive power being restrained within a
narrower compass, and being more simple in its nature, and the judiciary being
described by landmarks still less uncertain, projects of usurpation by either of
these departments would immediately betray and defeat themselves. Nor is this
all: as the legislative department alone has access to the pockets of the people, and
has in some constitutions full discretion, and in all a prevailing influence, over the
pecuniary rewards of those who fill the other departments, a dependence is thus
created in the latter, which gives still greater facility to encroachments of the
former.
Id. at 323. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton) (Bicentennial ed. 1976);
Burns & Markman, Understanding Separation of Powers, 7 PACE L. REv. 575 (1987).
21. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 504 (A. Hamilton) (Bicentennial ed. 1976) (quoting
C. MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF LAWS).
22. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 504 (A. Hamilton) (Bicentennial ed. 1976).
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John Marshall's Interpretation
Montesquieu's "next to nothing" judiciary and Hamilton's
"least dangerous" and "weakest" department promptly devel-
oped into a much more powerful institution. That Chief Justice
Marshall declined to entertain a weak and subservient role for
the Court is manifest in his opinion in Marbury v. Madison.2
Notwithstanding the dissembling disavowal of judicial interfer-
ence in the management of the executive department and disin-
genuous denial of any thought of invading the legislature's pre-
rogatives, John Marshall explicated the necessity and rationality
for judicial review which have remained fundamental in our ju-
risprudence and the operation of the tripartite functions of gov-
ernment. The authority of the Supreme Court has waxed and
waned over the years since Marshall's pronouncement of 1803;
at times the controversy has been very bitter, and still questions
are raised about the extent of the Court's participation and role
as ultimate decisionmaker in various areas of public and private
affairs.24 Nonetheless, in cases of enormous import25 the Su-
preme Court has reaffirmed Marshall's concept and rested its
reasoning upon the arguments advanced by the great Chief
Justice.
Marshall established the Court's authority to oversee the
acts of the executive and legislative departments as well as all
branches of State government when such acts directly or periph-
erally implicated constitutional issues. In Marbury, Marshall
claimed and won for the Supreme Court the authority to rule on
the constitutionality of acts of Congress and on the amenability
to court process of members of the executive branch of govern-
ment. Thus, in a horizontal fashion, the Court laid one hand on
the office of the President and another on Congress and linked
the legality of the acts of both to the Court's interpretation of
the constitutional delegation of powers.
In the same opinion, Marshall adumbrated the political
question doctrine. He distinguished political, discretionary acts
23. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
24. See generally Lusky, Judicial Review: A Wasting Asset, 7 PACE L. REV. 647
(1987).
25. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Powell v. McCormack, 395
U.S. 486 (1969); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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from non-political, ministerial duties of executive officers. He
recognized that in areas demanding political judgment and as-
sessment of choices, the Supreme Court should not claim au-
thority to override the President who, in such matters, "is ac-
countable only to his country in his political character, and to
his own conscience."2 Although he might not in reality have
been nearly so diffident to embark upon political decisionmaking
as the carefully chosen words of his opinion would have his con-
temporaries believe, Marshall was astute to refrain from project-
ing the Court's power to such a distance. But the distinction
that he drew between justiciable issues and political questions
offered a rationale for future generations of Supreme Court jus-
tices to justify an avoidance of pressing issues such as represen-
tation. One wonders whether Chief Justice Marshall would have
endorsed the judicial restraint advocated in the twentieth cen-
tury by some of his latter day brethren. During the century
before Baker v. Carr2 7 decided that legislative apportionment
was a justiciable issue, the doctrine of separation of powers con-
tinued to be tested and molded. Baker signaled a dramatic re-
treat from the philosophy of avoidance.
From Gettysburg to Youngstown
In the decades clustering around the middle of the nine-
teenth century, it was that other set of balances between the Na-
tional Government and asserted state sovereignty which domi-
nated American concerns. Even so, issues of separation of
powers surfaced at least as a reaction to some of the bold steps
taken by President Lincoln. There followed other pockets of his-
tory in which strong presidents in their own time, and later with
hindsight, were charged by some with exceeding their authority
and usurping functions of Congress. 8 The frustration of Presi-
dent Roosevelt with the Supreme Court during the early and
very active years of New Deal legislation led to quite a different
charge of overreaching. The Executive and Congress saw their
legislative initiatives repulsed by the Supreme Court's declara-
26. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 166.
27. 369 U.S. at 186.
28. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 683-700 (1952) (Vinson,
J., dissenting).
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tions of unconsitutionality. To some, it was the will of the peo-
ple being thwarted by a small, appointed, politically unrespon-
sive group of men who retained their posts for life. Congress,
however, was not willing to support the President's radical
court-packing plan.29
The best strokes of many opinions of the Supreme Court,
some delicate and some bold, have developed the doctrine of the
co-equal branches in cases focusing on the authority of the
Court. From Cooper v. Aaron,30 United States v. Klein,3 1 Brown
v. Board of Education,"2 and Baker v. Carr,3 3 to United States
v. Nixon,3 4 the Court has elaborated its Marshallian role as ex-
positor and final arbiter of the Constitution. One case which is
not merely of historical interest, however, merits particular at-
tention because it again focuses on the relationship of the execu-
tive and the legislative branches and because it may provide a
schema for analysis of contemporary conflicts.
The Steel Seizure Case, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer," arose out of a dispute between employees and steel
companies concerning terms of a new collective bargaining
agreement. Efforts of settlement having failed, the union gave
notice of a strike. The President, convinced that a shutdown of
the mills would cut off the steel indispensable to national de-
fense at a time when American forces were engaged in the Ko-
rean War, ordered the Secretary of Commerce to take possession
of the mills and keep them in operation. The steel companies
challenged the seizure, alleging that the President's order was
unconstitutional. The President asserted that in meeting the
grave emergency, his action was authorized by the aggregate of
express and implied constitutional powers.
The Supreme Court did not agree. The majority refused to
extrapolate from the commander in chief power, executive au-
thority to seize private property when the nation was not en-
gaged in a war formally declared by Congress. Absent constitu-
29. G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 370-77 (11th ed. 1985).
30. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
31. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871).
32. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
33. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
34. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
35. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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tional authority, the only other source the majority was willing
to accept was a statutory grant. None existed. Quite the con-
trary, Congress had, in deliberating the passage of the Taft-
Hartley Act, expressly refused to recognize governmental seizure
as a means of averting work stoppages in labor disputes. Thus,
the President in this matter had acted without any affirmative
constitutional support and in the face of a negative legislative
decision.
Justice Jackson, in his concurrence in Youngstown, cap-
tured the difficulty of maintaining a balance of power between
the President and Congress. "Presidential powers are not fixed
but fluctuate depending upon their disjunction or conjunction
with those of Congress." 6 He formulated three categories of
circumstances:
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied
authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it
includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Con-
gress can delegate....
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congres-
sional grant or denial of authority, he can rely only upon his own
independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he
and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its dis-
tribution is uncertain....
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the
expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest
ebb, for then he can rely only upon his constitutional powers mi-
nus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.3 7
Justice Jackson's analysis of article I and article II powers,
coupled with unwillingness to rely on inherent, implied, or re-
sulting powers, convinced him that the President's seizure fell
into the third category. He observed that Congress could, in sit-
uations of this nature, grant emergency powers and that the
President could not singly assume the authority. But Jackson
admonished: "We may say that the power to legislate for emer-
gencies belongs in the hands of Congress, but only Congress it-
self can prevent power from slipping through its fingers."38
36. Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
37. Id. at 635-57.
38. Id. at 654.
1987]
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Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in Youngstown reflects
the problem through a different prism. The powers and relation-
ship of the National Executive and Legislature cannot be under-
stood merely from a narrow view of the words of the Constitu-
tion, disregarding "the gloss which life has written upon
them."8"
In short, a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued
to the knowledge of the Congress, and never before questioned,
engaged in by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the Con-
stitution, making as it were such exercise of power part of the
structure of our government, may be treated as a gloss on "execu-
tive Power" vested in the President by §1 of Art. 1I.40
Such an accretion of executive power by "adverse posses-
sion" has developed into a major political issue. Congress has
undertaken substantial measures to reassert its control in inter-
nal matters, such as the Congressional Budget and Impound-
ment Control Act of 197441 and the Balanced Budget and Emer-
gency Deficit Control Act of 1985.4" However, the successful
challenge in the courts to certain provisions of the latter act 3 as
well as the Supreme Court's decision in Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service v. Chadha"4 that the legislative veto is uncon-
stitutional has yielded uneven results.
Stripping the Gloss
If the President can be called to task for attempting to exer-
cise aggregate inherent and implied powers in domestic affairs, is
the executive office subject to the same restraints in foreign af-
fairs? Clearly not, if United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp.40 remains the controlling authority.
In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, deli-
cate and manifold problems, the President alone has the power to
39. Id. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
40. Id. at 610-11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
41. Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (1974).
42. Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1037 (1985).
43. See generally Synar, Congressional Perspective on the Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, 7 PACE L. REv. 675 (1987).
44. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
45. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
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speak or listen as a representative of the nation .... As Marshall
said in his great argument of March 7, 1800, in the House of Rep-
resentatives, "The President is the sole organ of the nation in its
external relations, and its sole representative with foreign
nations.""'
The Court's reasoning in United States v. Pink,7 United
States v. Belmont,48 and Dames & Moore v. Regan" have con-
firmed the gloss on the Executive's power in the area of execu-
tive agreements in particular, and by association, foreign policy
in general.
Ever since the Vietnam War, the preeminence of the execu-
tive branch in the conduct of foreign relations has been chal-
lenged. The War Powers Resolution 51 is an attempt to ensure
that Congress participates in any decision to maintain American
armed forces in a theater of hostilities when there has been no
formal declaration of war. The constitutionality of the provisions
of the Resolution remain to be tested.
It is obvious that the conduct of foreign affairs and of war
today is not what it was in the first half of this century. Subtle,
ingenious, military and civilian means of influencing foreign pol-
icy have seemed to leave Congress, with its constitutionally enu-
merated, formal military powers outside the decisional frame-
work of critically important choices. That, it appears, is the
imbalance which Congress seeks now to redress, and even the
wisdom of judges cannot precisely or permanently determine the
ideal equilibrium.
The actual art of governing under our Constitution does not
and cannot conform to judicial definitions of the power of any of
its branches based on isolated clauses.... While the Constitution
diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates
that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable
government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but inter-
46. Id. at 319.
47. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
48. 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
49. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
50. 50 U.S.C. §1541 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). See generally Torricelli, The War
Powers Resolution After the Libya Crisis, 7 PACE L. REV. 661 (1987); Comment, A Bicen-
tennial View of the Role of Congress, the President, and the Judiciary in Regard to the
Power Over War, 7 PACE L. REV. 695 (1987).
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dependence, autonomy but reciprocity."
Montesquieu, Marshall, and Madison would agree.
51. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
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